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I. A BROKEN JAW AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION 
 
A. An Errant Tackle: A Case Study1 
 
In a rainy September morning in 2004, the Ateneo de Manila University 
Men’s Soccer team hosted the San Beda College Soccer team in a tune-up game.  
At that time, both teams were steadily preparing for their respective title  
defenses—the Ateneo Blue Booters won the University Athletic Association of 
the Philippines (UAAP) soccer crown, while the San Beda Red Lions had won 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) soccer title—and the 
game was supposed to be a measure for both squads in their hopes of reclaiming 
their respective titles.  It was also a chance for the coaches to field in new players 
and to see whether these young hopefuls had what was needed to play on the 
best Philippine collegiate soccer teams. 
One of those young hopefuls was Chino Tobias, a freshman from the Ateneo 
team.  Tobias played goalkeeper in high school and was hoping to make the 
team in his freshman year.  Ompong Merida, coach of the Ateneo squad, gave 
Tobias the nod that morning and sent the freshman to man the posts.  It was a 
day Tobias would never forget—and for all the wrong reasons. 
Tobias was tasked to face a San Beda squad determined to prove themselves 
against their counterparts.  The Red Lions, composed mostly of national team 
recruits, attacked the Ateneo goal incessantly.  Spearheading the attack was 
prized recruit Dan Padernal, an Ilonggo who was known for his football prowess 
but notorious for his dirty play.  Five years earlier in an Olympic qualifying 
                                                 
* Georgetown Law, LL.M. 2016; Ateneo de Manila University Law School (Philippines), J.D. 
2012; Ateneo de Manila University, B.S. 2006. © 2016, Ignatius Michael Ingles.  The author is a full-
time professor in the Ateneo Law School where he teaches Emerging Issues in Sports Law.  He is the 
editor-in-chief of Batas Sportiva, the Philippines’ first and only sports law blog.  This Article is an 
updated version of the author’s J.D. thesis.  The author would like to thank his Ateneo professors who 
helped shape this Article, namely Professors Rowena Soriano, Laurence Arroyo, Melencio Sta. Maria, 
Rudy Quimbo, Sarah Arriola, Christina Tecson, and the late Claro Tesoro.  He would also like to thank 
Professor Matt Mitten and the Marquette Sports Law Review for providing this Article a home.  Finally, 
he would like to thank his family and his wife for their unending support.  Ad majorem Dei gloriam.   
1. Author was the captain of the Ateneo Football Team and was present during the incident. 
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match between the Philippines and Japan, Padernal seriously injured rising  
Japanese football star Shinji Ono with a heinous tackle from behind.  At that 
time, the Philippines were already losing 110, and Padernal’s tackle was more 
likely a result of frustration than of hard-nosed defending.  The tackle tore one 
of Ono’s left knee ligaments, and the future of Japanese football was forced to 
watch the 2000 Sydney Olympics on the bench.2 
This time, the score was nil-nil, with the Red Lions’ attack kept at bay by 
the combined efforts of the Blue Booters and their upstart goalkeeper.   
And then it happened.  
A San Beda attack was foiled inside the Ateneo box, with the ball rolling 
into the area of Tobias.  Tobias dove for the ball, securing it safely in his arms.  
The play was supposed to be over—but Padernal, never one to give up, sprinted 
and then slid on the muddy pitch to win the ball from Tobias.  The momentum 
of his slide tackle brought him straight to Tobias who was caught unaware.  
With a sickening sound, Padernal’s knee caught Tobias squarely on the jaw. 
Helped by his teammates, Tobias gingerly stood up and was immediately 
substituted.  He was no longer in any condition to play.  Blood was pouring 
from his mouth, and his jaw was grotesquely out of place.  A medical check-up 
that afternoon revealed a broken jaw that required immediate surgery.  It took 
Tobias three months to recover from the incident, and more than a year to get 
back on the pitch.3 
 Despite the yellow card brandished to Padernal, the Ateneo team was not 
happy with the incident.  Coach Ompong Merida reported the incident to the 
Ateneo University Athletics Office, and fearing for the safety of his players, 
requested that Padernal be banned from playing within the Ateneo premises or 
whenever San Beda played Ateneo.  The Ateneo University Athletics Office 
heeded this policy and a ban on Padernal was imposed. 
 Fingers pointed to Padernal as the sole culprit of the injury—there was no 
doubt that he caused the injury.  In legal jargon, his sliding tackle was the  
proximate cause of Tobias’ broken jaw.  However, can he be held liable in court 
for the injury of Tobias?  In other words, was his act an actionable tort?  
While Padernal naturally took the brunt of the blame, whispers of blame 
soon swirled around the actions and decisions of San Beda coach Aris Caslib.  
Coach Caslib knew of the rough and tough nature of his prized recruit.  At the 
time of the incident, Padernal had already played two to three years under the 
tutelage of coach Caslib.  Moreover, the San Beda coach was fully aware of the 
                                                 
2. Kumi Kinohara, Reds’ Ono Looking to Recover His Form Before Seeking New Challenges 
Abroad, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 4, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2000/01/04/soccer/j-
league/reds-ono-looking-to-recover-his-form-before-seeking-new-challenges-abroad. 
3. E-mail from Chino Tobias to Ignatius Michael D. Ingles (June 10, 2011) (on file with author) 
(Note: Tobias did not file any legal action against Padernal.  He and his family, however, requested the 
Philippine Football Federation for a ban on Padernal.  The request was not heeded.). 
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Shinji Ono incident.  And yet, despite this knowledge, Caslib continued to field 
the fiery Padernal.  Was Caslib also to blame for Tobias’ injury?4   
The injury suffered by Tobias is a stark example of the danger of sports, 
especially contact sports such as soccer.  Injuries are commonplace in sports; 
some say it is even inherent in sports.5  But when does the infliction of injuries 
cross the legal line and give rise to legal liability?  And should coaches be liable 
for the tortious acts of their players? 
 
B. Game Plan 
 
The main legal issue I seek to address is the void in Article 2180 of the 
Philippine Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code).6  Article 2180 enumerates 
persons who are vicariously liable for the tortious acts of those under their care 
and supervision.7  The enumeration does not include coaches and their players, 
even if the relationship between coaches and players is also characterized by 
supervision and responsibility.  
I propose that coaches be held liable for the tortious acts of their players.  I 
                                                 
4. The Case Study will be answered in the conclusion of the article and will serve as a test case for 
the application of the proposals of the article. 
5. RAYMOND L. YASSER, TORTS AND SPORTS: LEGAL LIABILITY IN PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR 
ATHLETICS 3 (1985).  
6. CIVIL CODE, § 2180, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
7. Id.  
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or 
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. 
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the 
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. 
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are 
under their authority and live in their company. 
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for 
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are 
employed or on the occasion of their functions. 
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household 
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not  
engaged in any business or industry. 
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when 
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in 
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. 
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages 
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. 
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned 
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.  
(1903a). 
Id. 
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argue that the coach-player relationship is akin to the other instances of  
vicarious liability enumerated in the Civil Code, and thus, the coach should also 
be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of his players.  In Section III, I 
argue that the relationship between a coach and his players is one wherein the 
coach has a special responsibility over the players.  In Section IV and V, I also 
provide guidelines that will delineate the scope of a coach’s responsibility for 
the acts of his players: when should a coach be liable for the tortious conduct of 
his players?  When should he be absolved from liability?  I conclude by  
proposing an amendment to Article 2180 of the Civil Code to include vicarious 
liability on professional coaches. 
However, before vicarious liability can be applied, the principal tortfeasor 
must first be held liable.8  This leads to the second legal issue I seek to address: 
the absence of Philippine jurisprudence on the duty or standards of care  
applicable to sports or sporting competitions.  Hence, in Section II, I also  
establish standards for making participants in sports competitions liable for  
injuries of other participants.  Because of the peculiar circumstances inherent in 
sports competitions, the duty and standard of care required in sports are different 
from other situations.9  No such standards have been articulated in present  
Philippine laws or jurisprudence.  
Without a set standard, injured players in the Philippines find it difficult to 
recover, especially when faced with tort defenses such as the assumption of 
risk.10  Participants in contact sports naturally assume the risk of injury because 
these injuries are inherent and foreseeable in these sports.11  Assumption of risk 
is a defense recognized in the Philippines as well.  Thus, torts based on  
negligence occurring in sports competitions most likely fail.12  Hence, I propose 
a different duty of care that must be breached in sports cases in order to allow 
recovery by the injured party. This duty of care is the duty to refrain from the 
reckless disregard of safety rules,13 a duty recognized in the United States that 
should be adopted in the Philippines. 
 
C. A Snapshot of Philippine Sports 
 
One may think that the field of sports has little or nothing to offer society 
or law, especially in the Philippines.  Sports is often relegated to the back pages 
                                                 
8. Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 11844142 (S.C., Jan. 18, 2000) (Phil.), http://sc.judici-
ary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/jan2000/118441_42.html. 
9. WALTER T. CHAMPION, SPORTS LAW IN A NUT SHELL, 110 (4th ed. 2009). 
10. Id. at 144. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. YASSER, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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of newspapers, with sports stories only making the front pages when Manny 
Pacquiao brings home another title or the Gilas Pilipinas Basketball Team  
winning with the odds stacked against them.  The lack of professional leagues 
in the country also gives the impression that sports are neither taken seriously 
nor a worthy investment of time, skill, or money.  A quick comparison with 
countries with big sporting industries like the United States, China, or Spain 
further boost that impression.  
Nothing can be further from the truth.  The country may not yet have won 
a gold medal in the Olympics, or have multi-million dollar professional leagues 
for every sport, but the Philippines is still no different from the more developed 
countries when it comes to its culture and its relationship with sports.  The  
country is not a stranger to the fanfare, the controversies, and the money that 
come with the world of sports. 
A quick drive around Metro Manila would show that basketball is the sport 
in the country.  Pictures of basketball players endorsing products in the main 
thoroughfares and basketball courts donated by congressmen dot barangays 
everywhere.  The country’s love for the game is evident in Rafe Bartholomew’s 
book Pacific Rims14 where he talks about how the Philippines has embraced the 
game in practically every aspect of the Philippine culture.  
The rivalries involved with basketball, and the fanfare that comes with 
them, mimic those in the United States and in Europe.  Just like how the Boston 
Celtics-Los Angeles Lakers rivalry ushered in a new age for the National  
Basketball Association (NBA), the same has been said of the Crispa-Toyota  
rivalry in the 1970s and its impact on the country’s premier professional  
basketball league, the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).15  Sports  
rivalries and their fans have also impacted the amateur level—with the  
well-known rivalry between Ateneo and De La Salle University even reaching 
the sports pages of The New York Times in 2007.16 
While basketball is still the favorite sport in the Philippines, other sports 
have also caught on with the Filipino public.  Manny Pacquiao’s worldwide 
success as a boxer has created a growing interest in the sport.  Gyms and sports 
clubs have included boxing as one of the workouts open to their members.  With 
the recent success of the Philippine National Soccer Team, soccer has also 
gained popularity with Filipinos.  The United Football League, revamped in 
2009, has become the closest thing to a professional soccer league that the  
                                                 
14. See generally RAFE BARTHOLOMEW, PACIFIC RIMS: BEERMEN BALLIN’ IN FLIP-FLOPS AND 
THE PHILIPPINES’ UNLIKELY LOVE AFFAIR WITH BASKETBALL (2010). 
15. Norman Lee Benjamin Riego, BEST OF FIVE SERIES: The Rivalry That Gave Birth to the 
PBA, ABS-CBN SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2015), http://sports.abs-cbn.com/basketball/news/2015/04/12/best-
of-five-series-the-rivalry-gave-birth-pba-1744. 
16. Raphael Bartholomew, A Nation’s Passion Lives in a Rivalry of Green vs. Blue, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/sports/23rivalry.html. 
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country has seen in more than a decade.  
To say that a study of sports and its relation to torts law is irrelevant is  
turning a blind eye to the country’s love of sports—and the dark side that comes 
with it.  While the Philippines might not have a sports industry as developed as 
that of the United States, one need only look at the hoopla and fanfare  
surrounding sports to see that sports is just as well-received in the Philippines 
as in any other country.  Furthermore, the very nature of sports as competition, 
its hold on society’s psyche, and the underlying business and monetary interests 
nowadays have raised the stakes in sports.   
Today, there is so much at stake—losing can ruin your reputation and have 
you tagged as a match-fixer17 and winning can mean big endorsement contracts.  
These are reasons enough for a coach to adopt an over-aggressive tactic to beat 
an opponent or for players to play dirty, even to the extent of deliberately hurting 
others.18  Dirty play has always been part of sports, but it does not mean that it 
should be condoned.  It remains, obviously, unsportsmanlike. Resorting to dirty 
play can lead to serious injuries (remember Tobias’ broken jaw or Shinji Ono’s 
derailed career).  And of equal importance, it leads to alienation from one of the 
key characteristics of sports—the purity of honest competition. 
It is within this sphere that this Article operates.  The proposal and  
guidelines allow those victimized by dirty play to have civil redress within the 
Philippine legal system.  And, hopefully, it makes coaches and players think 
twice before they resort to such unsportsmanlike tactics. 
 
II. ALL EYES ON THE PLAYER 
 
This Section proposes that a different standard of care be applied to torts 
occurring in sports competitions: the duty to refrain from the reckless disregard 
of the safety rules of a sport.19  Recognition of such duty has been the recent 
trend of United States (U.S.) sports torts cases and U.S. courts have allowed 
recovery based either on intentional torts or from the breach of said duty (gross 
negligence or recklessness).20  Currently, Philippine jurisprudence is bereft of 
the application of torts law principles in the context of sports.  This Section 
addresses this void by adopting the standards learned from the U.S. cases to 
allow recovery in instances of sports torts.  A general overview of this standard 
and its application in U.S. cases is first discussed, followed by an overview of 
                                                 
17. Joey Villar, Barroca Dropped from FEU for Good, PHIL. STAR (Sept. 20, 2009), 
http://www.philstar.com/sports/506641/barroca-dropped-feu-good. 
18. Sharwin L. Tee, From the 50 Peso Seats: Open Letter to Commissioner Chito Salud, FIFTY 
PESO SEATS (Apr. 19, 2011), http://fiftypesoseats.blogspot.com/2011/04/open-letter-to-commissioner-
chito-salud.html.  
19. YASSER, supra note 5, at 4. 
20. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAW 412 (2d ed. 1994).  
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torts law in the Philippines that highlights laws and jurisprudence that support 
the adoption of this standard. 
 
A. A Warning to the Timorous 
 
Traditionally, injuries occurring in sports competitions have been accepted 
as commonplace.21  They were considered as a “natural outgrowth of the  
competitive and physical nature of sports.”22  This point cannot be denied.  Some 
sports actually require a certain amount of violence.  American football and 
rugby would not be the same without the sacks or the scrums, nor would soccer 
be the world’s most popular sport without the occasional slide tackle.  And who 
can deny that violence is needed, even essential, in sports like taekwondo or 
mixed martial arts?  Boxing without the actual punching would be nothing more 
than two sweaty men skipping and dancing around a square ring for an hour.  
Not even Manny Pacquiao, known for his knack for music and after-fight  
concerts, would appreciate such a scene.  
As such, in the earlier decades of the last century, cases involving sports 
injuries were rarely brought to court in the U.S.23  The legal landscape at that 
time “did not want to place an unreasonable burden on active participation in 
sports.”24  This was understandable—participants in sports competitions already 
“assume[d] to voluntarily embrace any danger that might occur in a sporting 
activity.”25  If an athlete suffers a dislocated shoulder from a late hit or a busted 
nose in a tussle for a rebound, the injured player could not (at least successfully) 
bring his opponent to court.  The best he could do was complain to the referee 
or take the matter into his own hands and retaliate.26  In fact, in the 1929 case of 
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement, Co., which involved a man who sued an 
amusement park after he fell off a rollercoaster (which the New York court  
considered a “sport”), Judge Cardozo, in what could best describe the attitude 
at that time, quipped: “the timorous may stay at home.”27 
The timorous, however, have not stayed at home.  And fortunately for them, 
the attitude of the court towards the liability of sports participants has changed 
through the years.28  Currently, injured players have found redress and success 
                                                 
21. Id. at 411. 
22. Id. 
23. See CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 110. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 111. 
26. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. (Hackbart II), 601 F.2d 516, 521 (10th Cir. 1979). 
27. CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 110 (quoting Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 
173 (N.Y. 1929)). 
28. See id. at 111. 
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in U.S. courts.  Recent U.S. cases have veered from the old attitude and have 
allowed injured athletes and participants to recover from fellow participants.29  
This recent trend is studied below and serves as the basis in adopting the  
standard of care and the duty not to be reckless in the Philippine setting.  
 
B. Overcoming the Defense 
 
There is an old saying in sports that the best defense is a strong offense.  But 
when it came to recovery based on sports torts, the best defense was the  
assumption of risk.30  In the early twentieth century, participants and players 
were considered to have assumed the risk of getting injured as it was a normal 
part of the game, and this defense “would block all attempts [of] recovery.”31  
In the 1926 case of McLeod Store v. Vinson,32 the Court of Appeals of  
Kentucky had the chance to rule on the liability of a guinea pig race organizer 
for injuries sustained by a minor, as the latter was chasing down a guinea pig.33  
While, strictly speaking, this is not a case involving a participant-on-participant 
injury (as the minor sued the organizer), the ruling remains instructive when it 
comes to the assumption of risk in sports.  The court, ruling against the minor, 
stated that “[a]n ordinary boy of that age is practically as well advised as to the 
hazards of baseball, basketball, football, foot races, and other games of skill and 
endurance as is an adult.”34  In other words, the minor was held to have assumed 
the risks of joining the guinea pig race, and was therefore precluded from  
recovering any damages.  
Three theories have been used in the attempt to overcome this defense and 
recover from injuries in sports competitions.35  The first theory is based on  
negligence.36  The second is based on intentional tort.37  The third is based on 
the reckless disregard of safety rules.38  Each theory will be discussed in this 
Section. 
 
i. First Theory: Recovery Through Negligence 
 
                                                 
29. See id. 
30. Id. at 144. 
31. Id. 
32. 281 S.W. 799 (Ky. 1926). 
33. Id. at 799. 
34. Id. 
35. YASSER, supra note 5, at 3. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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U.S. cases have shown that a theory of negligence is simply not enough to 
overcome the defense of assumption of risk.39  A prime example is Kabella v. 
Bouschelle wherein two kids were playing an informal game of tackle football.40  
Kabella had the football and Bouschelle attempted to tackle him.41  As 
Bouschelle wrapped his arms around Kabella in an attempt to bring him to the 
ground, the latter shouted, “I’m down.”42  Bouschelle did not heed Kabella’s 
cries and continued the tackle and slammed him into the ground.43  Kabella  
dislocated his hip and sued for more than $100,000 in damages under the theory 
that Bouschelle was negligent in his acts.44 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico ruled against Kabella.  It said that 
Kabella’s theory of negligence was not enough to overcome the fact that he 
assumed the risks of injury in playing an informal game of tackle football.45  
Moreover, the appellate court stated that there was no showing of intent or  
recklessness on the part of Bouschelle.46 
In Keller v. Mols, two minors were playing a game of floor hockey.47  Keller 
played goalie and was not wearing any protective equipment.48  Mols took a 
shot at the goal, sending the puck whizzing through the air.49  Unfortunately, the 
plastic puck did not find the back of the net, but found Keller’s face instead.50  
Keller sued, claiming Mols was negligent for shooting the puck in his direction, 
knowing that he (Keller) did not have any protective equipment.51  Ruling 
against Keller, the Appellate Court of Illinois stated that Keller’s contention of 
negligence could not be sustained because of his voluntary participation in a 
contact sport (where injuries could be reasonably foreseen).52  Moreover, the 
court pointed out that Mols’ shot was neither “willful [nor] wanton conduct.”53 
While negligence is not enough, plaintiffs have managed to recover by  
using two theories: first, that the defendant intentionally and deliberately  
inflicted the injury; and second, that the injury resulted from a reckless disregard 
                                                 
39. Id. at 22. 
40. Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 291 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).  
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. at 293. 
46. Id. at 293–94.   
47. Keller v. Mols, 509 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
48. Id.  
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 586. 
53. Id. at 585. 
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for safety.54 
 
ii. Second Theory: Intentional Torts  
 
One of the earliest sports torts cases is Griggas v. Clauson.55  This case 
showed that recovery from injuries sustained in sports competitions was  
possible on the basis of an intentional tort theory.  Decided by the Illinois  
Appellate Court in 1955, the case involved a rather violent incident that  
occurred during a basketball game.56  Griggas and Clauson played against each 
other in an amateur basketball game.57  While Griggas had his back turned on 
Clauson, the latter suddenly punched him, causing the former to fall on the floor 
unconscious.58  Clauson was not content with the blow and continued to curse 
the fallen Griggas.59  Griggas spent the next month in the hospital and  
subsequently sued Clauson.60  Unsurprisingly, the court ruled in favor of the 
injured party, ordering Clauson to pay $2,000 in damages.61 
In 1957, a Tennessee court once again ruled in favor of the injured party 
after an intentional tort was committed by an opposing player.  In Averill v. 
Luttrell,62 the parties were from opposing teams in a minor league baseball game 
in Tennessee.63  Luttrell was up at bat, while Averill crouched behind him as 
catcher.64  After a few pitches almost “nicked” him, Luttrell threw his bat  
towards the pitcher’s mound in anger.65  Surprisingly, it was Averill, the catcher, 
who took exception and struck Luttrell on the back of the head.66  The blow 
rendered Luttrell unconscious, and he suffered a broken jaw as he hit the 
ground.67  The court ruled for Luttrell, saying “the assault made by Averill ‘was 
no[t] part of the ordinary risks expected to be encountered in sportsmanlike 
play.’”68 
These two cases show that intentional torts occurring within sports  
                                                 
54. YASSER, supra note 5, at 23. 
55. 128 N.E.2d 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955).  
56. Id. at 364. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 364, 366.  
62. 311 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957). 
63. Id. at 812. 
64. Id. at 813. 
65. Id. at 814. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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competitions will allow recovery by the injured party.  These intentional torts 
are obviously not assumed by the players as ordinary risks of the game,  
effectively overcoming the defense of assumption of risk.  This, of course, 
makes sense.  A basketball player does not step onto the court foreseeing that 
an opponent might punch him, nor does a batter foresee that an opposing catcher 
will strike him unconscious.  An athlete simply does not assume an  
unforeseeable risk. 
The problem arises when the act that led to the injury is not coupled with 
intent to harm.  Intent is, of course, hard to prove.  In Griggas and Averill, the 
intent was obvious: the blows happened out of nowhere, unprovoked, and were 
not even part of the flow of the game.  In Griggas, the intent was made more 
obvious when Clauson continued to threaten the unconscious Griggas.69 
But what if the injury occurs during the run of play?  In the Case Study, 
how do we determine Padernal’s true intent?  He was, after all, going for the 
ball in a muddy and slippery field.  Will such action manage to overcome the 
assumption of risk, considering that the intention of the defendant can be easily 
masked as a reasonable display of aggression or competitive spirit, which are 
both part of the game? 
 
iii. Third Theory: Reckless Disregard of Safety Rules 
 
Nabozny v. Barnhill introduced the concept of recklessness and safety rules 
violations in the arena of sports torts in 1975.70  Nabozny was the goalkeeper of 
the amateur soccer team that played against Barnhill’s team.71  Twenty minutes 
into the game, two players (Barnhill and Gallos, who was Nabozny’s teammate) 
chased the ball into Nabozny’s area.72  Gallos won the footrace and passed the 
ball back to his goalkeeper.73  Gallos turned around and ran to an open position 
to receive the ball back from Nabozny.74  The latter got down on a knee, picked 
the ball up, and secured it against his chest.75  Barnhill, however, did not give 
up on the play and continued to sprint towards Nabozny.76  To the surprise of 
most (and eerily similar to the case of Padernal and Tobias), Barnhill unleashed 
a kick to the left side of Nabozny’s head, causing “severe injuries.”77 
                                                 
69. See Griggas v. Clauson, 128 N.E.2d 363, 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955). 
70. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
71. Id. at 259. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 260. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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Nabozny filed an action to recover damages for the acts of Barnhill.78   
During trial, witnesses testified that Barnhill violated a FIFA rule that “any  
contact with a goalkeeper in possession in the penalty area is an infraction of 
the rules, even if such contact is unintentional.”79  On appeal, the Illinois  
Appellate Court was faced with the issue of “whether the interest of the plaintiff 
which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the 
defendant.”80  Ruling for Nabozny, the court stated that while “the law should 
not place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports 
by our youth,”81 athletic competition should not “exist in a vacuum.”82  It added, 
“[S]ome of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete onto the 
playing field.”83 
The court also took into account the violation of the safety rules committed 
by Barnhill.  It recognized that while some rules “secure the better playing of 
the game as a test of skill[,]”84 others “are primarily designed to protect  
participants from serious injury.”85  These safety rules charge players “with a 
legal duty to every other player on the field to refrain from conduct proscribed 
by a safety rule.”86  
To the argument of Barnhill that he was immune from any liability arising 
from an injury occurring during a game, the court stated, “a player is liable for 
injury in a tort action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, wi[l]lful 
or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player so as to cause injury 
to that player.”87   
In deciding the case, the court was also aware that it was departing from the 
old tradition of leaving the “timorous at home,” as it said, “We have carefully 
drawn the rule announced herein in order to control a new field of personal  
injury litigation.”88  Nabozny highlighted that a showing of a reckless disregard 
for safety rules on the part of the defendant is another avenue to recover from a 
sports tort. 
The lessons of Nabozny were strengthened the following year in Bourque v. 
                                                 
78. Id. at 259. 
79. Id. at 260.  (The Fédération Internationale de Football Association, or FIFA, is the international 
governing body for football.). 
80. Id. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 261 (emphasis added). 
87. Id. (emphasis added). 
88. Id. 
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Duplechin.89  This Louisiana case showed the interplay between the duty to 
avoid reckless behavior and the defense of assumption of risk.  Bourque was a 
second baseman for his amateur softball team, while Duplechin played for the 
opposite team.90  Duplechin had managed to get on first base after hitting a  
single.91  He ran for second base after his teammate hit a ground ball.92  The hit 
was fielded by Bourque’s teammate who threw the ball to Bourque to execute a 
double-play.93  Bourque tagged second base and threw the ball to first base.94  
However, Duplechin continued his sprint towards Bourque and clotheslined the 
latter.95  At that time, Bourque was standing four or five feet away from second 
base.96  The umpire quickly threw Duplechin out of the game for  
unsportsmanlike conduct.97 
Bourque sued Duplechin and an insurance firm for damages.98  The  
defendants raised the defense of assumption of risk, claiming “that Bourque  
assumed the risk of injury by participating in the softball game.”99  They also 
raised the defense of contributory negligence on the part of Bourque.100 
Ruling for Bourque, the Louisiana Court of Appeals stated that “Bourque 
assumed the risk of being hit by a bat or a ball[,]”101 or the risk of “an injury 
resulting from standing in the base path and being spiked by someone sliding 
into second base, a common incident of softball and baseball.”102  Borque,  
however, “did not assume the risk of Duplechin going out of his way to run into 
him at full speed when Bourque was five feet away from the base.”103  Stating 
it generally, the court said:  
 
A participant in a game or sport assumes all of the risks  
incidental to that particular activity which are obvious and  
foreseeable.  A participant does not assume the risk of injury 
from fellow players acting in an unexpected or unsportsmanlike 
                                                 
89. 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 
90. Id. at 41. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id.  
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 41–42. 
97. Id. at 42. 
98. Id. at 41. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 42. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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way with a reckless lack of concern for others participating.104  
 
As to the duty breached by Duplechin, the court said that he was “under a 
duty to play softball in the ordinary fashion without unsportsmanlike conduct 
or wanton injury to his fellow players.”105 
The application of these lessons is not limited to the amateur sports scene.  
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,106 the court had a chance to apply these 
lessons to professional sports.  Hackbart was a football player for the Denver 
Broncos in the National Football League (NFL), while Clark played for the  
Cincinnati Bengals.107  Hackbart played the position of safety.108  Clark played 
fullback.109  At the time of the incident, the Bengals were in possession of the 
ball and they attempted to pass the ball towards the end zone for a touchdown.110  
However, a Broncos player intercepted the ball and ended whatever hopes the 
Bengals had in scoring a touchdown.111  At this point, Hackbart fell to the 
ground, while Clark stood behind him; both watched the play continue up 
field.112  In frustration, “but without a specific intent to injure,”113 Clark struck 
Hackbart on the back of his head.114  The blow remained unnoticed by players, 
coaches, and referees alike and the game continued on.115 
Later that day, Hackbart started to feel pain and soreness on the back of his 
head but he still did not seek medical assistance.116  He continued to play for the 
Broncos for two more weeks until he was dropped from the lineup.117  Only then 
did Hackbart go to a doctor and discover that he suffered a neck injury.118 
 Hackbart filed a case against Clark and the Bengals for damages, claiming 
that “Clark’s foul was so far outside of the rules of play and accepted practices 
of professional football that it should be characterized as reckless  
misconduct.”119  The judge ruled for Clark, stating that the “level of violence 
                                                 
104. Id. (emphasis added). 
105. Id. 
106. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977). 
107. Id. at 353. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id.  
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 354–55. 
118. Id. at 354. 
119. Id. at 355. 
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and the frequency of emotional outbursts in NFL football games are such that 
Dale Hackbart must have recognized and accepted the risk that he would be 
injured by such an act as that committed by the defendant Clark.”120  The judge 
further stated that Hackbart “assumed the risk of such an occurrence”121 and that 
“even if [Clark] breached a duty which he owed to [Hackbart], there can be no 
recovery because of assumption of the risk.”122 
The judgment was reversed on appeal.123  The circuit judge held that “there 
are no principles of law which allow a court to rule out certain tortious conduct 
by reason of general roughness of the game or difficulty of administering it.”124  
Moreover, the appellate court considered that the NFL Rules prohibited players 
from striking other players on certain areas of the body, like the neck or the 
head.125  Since Clark’s strike violated such safety rules, he was liable.126 
The appellate court also discussed the difference between intentional acts 
and reckless acts.  The former consisted of assault or battery, which both call 
for an intent to cause a particular harm.127  On the other hand, “[t]o be reckless[,] 
the [a]ct must have been intended by the actor,”128 but without the intent “to 
cause the harm which results from it.”129  While both intentional and reckless 
acts could be a basis for a tort action, the appellate court emphasized, “[T]hese 
two liability concepts are not necessarily opposed one to the other.”130  Hence, 
the plaintiff can choose between the two depending on the factual  
circumstances.  
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. (Hackbart II), the appellate court 
considered Clark’s blow an act of recklessness.131  The court noted, “Clark  
admittedly acted impulsively and in the heat of anger, and even though it could 
be said from the admitted facts that he intended the act, it could also be said that 
he did not intend to inflict serious injury which resulted from the blow which he 
struck.”132 
The lesson learned in Hackbart II is the delineation between intentional acts 
and reckless acts.  This gives the plaintiff a choice on the theory to pursue.  Both 
                                                 
120. Id. at 356. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. (Hackbart II), 601 F.2d 516, 527 (10th Cir. 1979). 
124. Id. at 520. 
125. Id. at 521. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 525. 
128. Id. at 534. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 525. 
132. Id. at 524. 
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theories have been shown to overcome the defense of assumption of risk.  
While Hackbart II stated the difference between intentional acts and  
reckless acts, it did not distinguish negligent acts from reckless acts.  The  
delineation is essential as only a theory based on recklessness will enable the 
plaintiff to overcome the assumption of risk defense.  Raymond Yasser defines 
recklessness as “conduct which creates a higher degree of risk than that created 
by simple negligence.”133  Hence, the difference between recklessness and  
negligence is that the former “creates a higher degree of risk” than the latter.134 
 Recovery through theories based on intentional tort or reckless disregard of 
safety rules was reaffirmed in the 1990 Nebraska case of Dotzler v. Tuttle.135  
Dotzler and Tuttle were playing a pick-up basketball game at an Omaha 
YMCA.136  The two collided near the free-throw line and the collision sent 
Dotzler “flying backward [nineteen] or [twenty] feet.”137  Dotzler fell and  
fractured both his wrists.138  The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case 
for a new trial, but not before summarizing the rules on participant liability: 
 
Adopting the rationale of the majority rule, we hold that a  
participant in a game involving a contact sport such as  
basketball is liable for injuries in a tort action only if his or her 
conduct is such that it is either willful[ly] [intentional] or with 
a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player, but is not 
liable for ordinary negligence.139  
 
Using either theory is not a guarantee that recovery can be made.  Each case 
must still be decided according to its particular circumstances.  For example, in 
Barrett v. Phillips,140 the plaintiff Barrett sued a high school and an athletic  
association after his son was killed during a high school football game.141   
Barrett’s theory revolved around the defendants’ alleged violation of a rule  
prohibiting players over nineteen from playing (Barrett’s son died in a collision 
with a twenty-year-old).142  The court ruled that this was not a safety rule (like 
that in Nabozny) and that there was no “causal relation between the violation 
                                                 
133. YASSER, supra note 5, at 4. 
134. Id. 
135. Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990). 
136. Id. at 776. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 779 (emphasis added). 
140. 223 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). 
141. Id.  
142. Id. at 919. 
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and the injury res[ult]ing in the boy’s death.”143  Analysis of this case would 
reveal that Barrett failed in two aspects: first, the violated rule was not a safety 
rule, hence Nabozny would not apply; and second, the violation of the rule was 
not the proximate cause of the death. 
Another example is Gauvin v. Clark.144  Gauvin and Clark played opposite 
each other in a collegiate hockey league.145  After a face-off wherein the two 
tussled for the puck, Gauvin felt a blow in his abdomen area.146  The blow came 
from Clark who hit Gauvin with the “butt-end” of his hockey stick.147  Gauvin 
was severely injured by the blow—he underwent surgery to remove his spleen 
and was forced to miss school.148  
The court found that “[t]he safety rules which govern the game of hockey 
prohibit ‘butt-ending,’”149 and that there was indeed a violation of this safety 
rule.150  Despite this, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts still ruled against 
Gauvin.  The Court claimed that it was not enough that a safety rule was  
violated: the violation must be “predicated on reckless disregard of safety.”151  
The cases show that for a theory based on reckless misconduct to prosper in 
a case wherein the plaintiff is injured, it is imperative that two requisites occur: 
first, a violation of a safety rule (as in Nabozny); and second, the violation must 
have been through a reckless act (as stated in Clark and defined by Yasser), and 
not through a merely negligent one.  
The trend of the cases also shows that “as a matter of policy, it is appropriate 
to adopt a standard of care imposing . . . a legal duty to refrain from reckless or 
intentional conduct.”152  The breach of this duty gives rise to a tort action.  In 
summarizing the effect of these decisions, Yasser stated it best: “It does appear 
. . . that sports activity is one area of human behavior where the participants are 
indeed insulated from liability for ordinary negligence.  Perhaps this is one thing 
that makes sports a special and unique form of human experience—participants 
are free to be unreasonable (but not reckless).”153 
 
                                                 
143. Id. at 920. 
144. 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989). 
145. Id. at 95. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 96. 
151. Id. at 97. 
152. Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 339 (Conn. 1997). 
153. YASSER, supra note 5, at 28. 
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C. Applying the Three American Theories in the Philippine Setting 
 
The three theories—negligence, intentional tort, and reckless disregard of 
safety rules—have been used in the U.S. in approaching sports participant  
liability cases.  While actions based on the first theory have failed to overcome 
the defense of assumption of risk, the second and third have proven successful 
in recovering damages for the injured participant.   
Which of these theories are already sufficiently covered by present  
Philippine laws and jurisprudence?  What tort principles recognized and used 
by the Supreme Court allow or contradict the adoption of these theories, namely 
the third theory?  
This Section shows that existing Philippines laws and jurisprudence readily 
cover the first and second theories, while it has yet to adopt the third theory. 
Allowing such theory to prosper in the local legal system is predicated upon the 
adoption of lessons learned from Nabozny—namely, a legal duty must exist to 
refrain from reckless acts which disregard safety rules.  As such, this Section 
provides a survey of supporting laws and jurisprudence that will allow the  
adoption of this legal duty. 
 
i. Philippine Torts 
 
Torts are “wrong[s] independent of a contract, which arise[] from an act or 
omission of a person which causes some injury or damage directly or indirectly 
to another person.”154  The governing provision for torts is found in Article 2176 
of the Civil Code.155  The provision teaches that a tort occurs whenever one 
damages or injures another by an act or omission, through fault or negligence.  
 
ii. Negligence in the Philippines: Synthesis with the First Theory 
 
Torts cover negligent acts.156  Negligence is the “failure to observe, for the 
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and 
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.”157  Picart v. Smith provided 
the test of negligence:158  
 
                                                 
154. ERNESTO L. PINEDA, TORTS AND DAMAGES (ANNOTATED) 2 (2009 ed. 2009).  
155. CIVIL CODE, § 2176, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.).  “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to 
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.  Such fault or negligence, 
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is  
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a).”  Id. 
156. See id. 
157. United States v. Barias, G.R. No. 7567 (S.C., Nov. 12, 1912) (Phil.). 
158. Picart v. Smith, G.R. No. L-12219 (S.C., Mar. 15, 1918) (Phil.). 
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Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the po-
sition of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harm-
ful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing 
conduct or guarding against its consequences.159 
 
As can be gathered from the definition, negligence depends on  
foreseeability:  hence, if the risk is unforeseeable, then one cannot be considered 
negligent.  Also, negligence is a relative term and the existence thereof is judged 
by the surrounding circumstances.160  Hence, the act of one in a certain situation 
may be called negligent, while the same act in another situation may not be 
called such.  For example, a man who throws stones over a fence into a 
schoolyard may be negligent if he hits one of the students because it is  
foreseeable that kids are in the schoolyard.  However, a man who throws stones 
over a fence into a deserted lot on the other side may not be negligent if he hits 
a person because it is not foreseeable that a person will be in the deserted lot. 
 A claim of negligence can be trumped by the defense of the assumption 
of risk.  Hence, like in the U.S., a theory based on negligence will most likely 
fail in Philippine courts.161  Philippine jurisprudence has recognized assumption 
of risk as a viable defense in personal injury cases.162  
Assumption of risk is a “voluntary assumption of a risk of harm arising from 
the negligent conduct of the defendant.  It presupposes an intentional exposure 
to a known peril.”163 This defense was used in the 1949 case of Alfiada v. 
Hisole,164 wherein a caretaker of carabaos was gored to death.165  The Court 
ruled against the recovery of the plaintiff and stated “being injured by the animal 
under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had 
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.”166  
With sports generally played under the same rules and with the same  
competitive and vigorous spirit in the U.S. as it is in the Philippines, a valid 
defense based on assumption of risk likewise applies.   The defendant can argue 
that the injured player assumed the risk of an injury by participating in a sports 
competition.  After all, injuries are foreseeable risks in sports.167  For  
professional sports, injuries can be seen as “one of the risks of the occupation 
                                                 
159. Id.  
160. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 8. 
161. Champion defines negligence the same way jurisprudence defines it: actions falling beyond 
the reasonable man standard. CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 110. 
162. See Afialda v. Hisole, G.R. No. L-2075 (S.C., Nov. 29, 1949) (Phil.). 
163. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 74. 
164. Afialda, G.R. No. L-2075. 
165. Id. 
166. Id.  
167. WONG, supra note 20, at 411. 
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which [a player has] voluntarily assumed.”168  In the Case Study, Padernal can 
validly argue that Tobias assumed the risk of an injury while playing football, 
considering the wet and muddy conditions that morning.  Hence, adopting the 
negligence theory in the Philippines leads to the same outcome as in the U.S.: 
no recovery.  Because of the particular nature of sports competitions,  
assumption of risk will trump an action based on negligence. 
 
 
iii. Intentional Torts in the Philippines: Synthesis with the Second 
Theory 
 
Originally, the Philippine Civil Code Commission did not want to use the 
term “tort” to avoid the broad coverage which the term implied in common law 
countries.169  However, Philippine jurisprudence has freely interchanged the two 
terms.  The current state of jurisprudence includes intentional acts within the 
application of Article 2176.170  In Naguiat v. National Labor Relations  
Commission, the Supreme Court stated, “Essentially, ‘tort’ consists in the  
violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law.  Simply 
stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.”171  It did not make a distinction between 
fault or negligence—an act was a tort as long as a legal duty was breached.  
Hence, intentional torts are covered by Article 2176. 
Moreover, the wording of Article 2176 makes it clear that intentional acts 
are included in the scope of torts—the damage caused to another may have  
occurred either through “fault or negligence.”172  The former implies damage 
was intended.  Fault has also been defined to be the “execution of a positive act 
but the act was done contrary to the normal way of doing it and ultimately  
causing damage or injury to another.”173  For example, throwing a stone at a 
little boy with the intention of hitting him is a tort based on fault.  
 Torts also covers acts that are already covered under the Philippine  
Revised Penal Code.  Hence, those injured by such acts can recover from those 
liable because “[r]esponsibility for fault or negligence under [Article 2176] is 
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence  
under the Penal Code.”174  This allows the injured party to file a separate civil 
                                                 
168. Afialda, G.R. No. L-2075. 
169. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 3–4 (citing REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED 
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 16162). 
170. See id. at 5. 
171. Naguiat v. Nat’l Labor Relations Comm’n, G.R. No. 116123 (S.C., Mar. 13, 1997) (Phil.), 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/116123.htm. 
172. CIVIL CODE, § 2176, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
173. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 7–8 (emphasis omitted). 
174. CIVIL CODE, § 2177. 
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action to recover damages, but he “cannot recover damages twice for the same 
act or omission of the defendant.”175  This puts to rest any doubt that the current 
state of torts law in the Philippines includes intentional acts, as acts under the 
Revised Penal Code are essentially and generally done with intent. 
 Hence, Philippine laws and jurisprudence already cover the second  
theory.  A sports participant can recover from an injury sustained in a sports 
competition if he manages to prove that the defendant intentionally inflicted his 
injury.  For example, if the Griggas case were to happen in a Philippine  
collegiate basketball game, the injured player can sue on the basis of intentional 
tort.  The plaintiff can also sue on the basis of Naguiat.  
 The problem with using this approach is the difficulty of proving intent.  
Note that the factual circumstances of Griggas and Averill clearly show that an 
intent to harm was present—the attacks were unprovoked, and were either done 
in a menacing manner (Griggas) or after the play was supposed to be over  
(Averill).  But what if the factual circumstances were not as clear-cut as these 
two cases?  In the Case Study, it is not readily apparent that Padernal’s tackle 
was coupled with intent to harm.  Therein lies the need to adopt the U.S. stand-
ard of care in the Philippines. 
 
iv. Reckless Disregard of Safety Rules: Supporting Philippine Laws 
and Jurisprudence 
 
The present Philippine legal landscape is similar to the American legal  
landscape pre-Nabozny.  The Supreme Court has yet to encounter any case that 
involves sports torts, specifically, participant or player liability.176  There is a 
present dearth in our local jurisprudence in determining the standard of care and 
the duty corresponding to it when it comes to participant or player liability.  This 
works as an injustice to injured parties who do not have any recourse against 
unsportsmanlike and reckless plays, leaving them with the options of  
complaining to the referees,177 retaliating178 or following Justice Cardozo’s  
advice to the timorous to simply “stay at home.”179  Either way, the  
                                                 
175. Id. 
176. The closest the Supreme Court has come to deciding a sports torts issue in the Philippines was 
Philippine Soap Box Derby, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108115 (S.C., Oct. 27, 1995) (Phil.).  
However, that case involved a suit for damages based on alleged wrongful acts of match officials, and 
not acts or injuries of the participants themselves.  In terms of deaths in the sports context, the Supreme 
Court has already decided on such an event in De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., G.R. No. 
L-21574 (S.C., June 30, 1966) (Phil.), but the decision dealt of an insurance issue, rather than torts. 
177. Which rarely works as any athlete will attest to. 
178. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 521 (10th Cir. 1979).  
179. CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 110 (quoting Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 
173 (N.Y. 1929)).  (Note: The injured player also has the option of complaining to the referee or the 
sports governing body, just like what Tobias did when he requested the Philippine Football Federation 
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constitutional policy of prioritizing sports “to foster patriotism and nationalism, 
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and  
development”180 is thrown out the window. 
Thus, there is a need for a Philippine standard that serves as a middle ground 
between the theories of negligence and intentional torts and allow participants 
to recover from injuries sustained during sports competitions.  Adopting the  
legal duty to refrain from a reckless disregard of safety rules in sports  
competitions addresses this need.  This should be the standard in future sports 
torts cases involving participant injuries and liability.  Philippine laws and  
jurisprudence support the adoption of this duty. 
First, both the U.S. and the Philippines observe the same basic torts  
principles.  In both jurisdictions, there must be a legal duty, a breach of that 
duty, and a causal connection between the breach and the injury to maintain 
actions based on torts.181  In Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals,182 the Court 
emphasized this, stating: 
 
in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries 
of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries  
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the 
plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal  
responsibility by the person causing it.  The underlying basis 
for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual 
was injured in contemplation of law.  Thus, there must first be 
the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that 
breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to 
state that there should be tort liability merely because the  
plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.183  
 
This duty consists of maintaining the standard of care, which the  
circumstances justly demand.184  For example, an electric company was held to 
have a duty to maintain “a very high degree of care” in the operation of its  
                                                 
for the ban on Padernal.  This option, however, is not viable for the player who wants to recover  
damages.  The sports governing body can reprimand, suspend, or fine the player for such actions, but 
this will only cover professional and organized leagues.  It will not cover instances such as informal or 
pick-up games.  Moreover, fining a player for causing injury to another does not guarantee that the 
money from the fine will go to the injured player.  The money collected from the fines are usually 
placed in the budget of the organizer for the current or upcoming season.). 
180. CONST. (1987), art. II, § 17 (Phil.).  
181. CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 11116. 
182. G.R. No. 116100 (S.C., Feb. 9, 1996) (Phil.), http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence 
/1996/feb1996/116100.htm. 
183. Id. (emphasis added). 
184. United States v. Barias, G.R. No. 7567 (S.C., Nov. 12, 1912) (Phil.). 
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business because of the dangers it had on the lives of the public.185  A common 
carrier, on the other hand, has the duty “to carry passengers safely . . . using the 
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the  
circumstances.”186  For banks, the degree of diligence required is “more than 
that of a good father of a family[,]”187 considering that it is imbued with public 
interest.188  Absent any standard imposed by law or contract, the degree of  
diligence required will be that “of a good father of a family.”189  Hence, given 
that both jurisdictions follow the basic torts principles, there is no obstacle in 
adopting a legal duty, which applies specifically to a certain context (sports 
competitions). 
Second, both the U.S. courts and the Philippine Supreme Court recognize 
the importance of considering the connection between rules and the injuries or 
situations that they seek to prevent.  The Philippine Supreme Court has already 
paved the way for the application of the legal duty to abide by safety rules in a 
1973 decision.  In Teague v. Fernandez,190 the Supreme Court held Teague  
liable for violating a safety ordinance (maintaining two staircases in a building) 
that caused overcrowding and subsequent injuries to some students.191  While 
the Court recognized that the violation of the safety ordinance was not the  
proximate cause of the accident per se, the Court still held Teague liable because 
“the accident . . . was the very thing which the statute or ordinance [would have] 
[p]revent[ed].”192  The same logic was used in Barrett, albeit leading to a  
different result.  There, the U.S. court denied recovery to the plaintiff because 
the accident (death of a high school student) was not the very thing that the rule 
(prohibiting older players from joining) would have prevented.193  The injury 
must be one that the rule would have prevented. 
Third, the Philippine Supreme Court has also recognized the need for the 
causal connection between the injury and the violation of the safety rule.  In 
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,194 the Court stated that one 
“must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of 
                                                 
185. Carlos v. Manila Elec. R.R. & Light Co., G.R. No. L-10838 (S.C., Mar. 1, 1916) (Phil.). 
186. CIVIL CODE, § 1755, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
187. Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112160, (S.C., Feb. 28, 2000) (Phil.), http://sc.judici-
ary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/feb2000/112160.htm. 
188. Id. 
189. CIVIL CODE, § 1163. 
190. G.R. No. L-29745 (S.C., June 4, 1973) (Phil.).  
191. Id. 
192. Id. (citing 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 168 (1941)). 
193. Barrett v. Phillips, 223 S.E.2d 918, 91920 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).  
194. G.R. No. 119092 (S.C., Dec. 10, 1998) (Phil.), http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence 
/1998/dec1998/119092.htm. 
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the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.”195   It also stated that a 
violation of a law is “without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause 
of the injury.”196  This stands on equal footing as Barrett wherein the U.S. court 
stated that there must also be a causal connection between the violation of the 
rule and the injury.197  
Teague or Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. does not indicate the degree of  
violation needed to make such violation a breach of a legal duty.  The two  
Philippine cases seem to indicate that any violation (whether negligent or  
reckless) will give rise to liability as long as “the accident . . . was the very thing 
which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.”198  It must, however, 
be remembered that in sports, only a reckless violation of a safety rule will lead 
to liability.  This stems from the natural risks associated with sports and its 
recognition under the law.199 
Fourth, the U.S. and the Philippines share the same concept of recklessness.  
In the U.S., for an act to be reckless, “the act must have been intended by the 
actor,”200 but without the intent to cause the harm which results from it.201  
Yasser defines it as “conduct which creates a higher degree of risk than that 
created by simple negligence.”202  In the Philippines, recklessness  
 
consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or fa[i]ling to 
do an act from which material damage results by reason of  
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person  
performing o[r] failing to perform such act, taking into  
consideration . . . [the] circumstances regarding persons, time 
and place.203  
 
Hence, in adopting the legal duty to refrain from reckless disregard of safety 
rules, the Philippine courts need not look far for an adequate definition of  
recklessness. 
The foundations for adopting this proposed legal duty are already present in 
Philippine laws and jurisprudence.  Analysis reveals that the basic concepts of 
the proposed legal duty are already present in the Philippine legal system, albeit 
                                                 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Barrett, 223 S.E.2d at 920.  
198. Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745 (S.C., June 4, 1973) (Phil.) (citing 38 AM. JUR.  
Negligence § 168 (1941)). 
199. CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 144. 
200. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir. 1979). 
201. Id. 
202. YASSER, supra note 5, at 4. 
203. REVISED PENAL CODE, Act No. 3815 art. 365, as amended (Phil.) (emphasis added). 
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scattered through different laws and doctrines.  All that is needed to adopt such 
legal duty in sports is to simply synthesize these different concepts into an  
overarching doctrine—and this is exactly what I have done in this Subsection.  
Thus, there is no legal obstacle in adopting this duty to refrain from reckless 
disregard of safety rules in sports competitions; and, in the words of Ultimate 
Fighting Championship ring announcer Bruce Buffer, “it’s time” to enrich the 
Philippine legal system with it. 
 
III. BUT WATCH THE COACH, TOO 
 
Now that standards have been placed to make a player liable, I propose that 
Article 2180 of the Civil Code be amended to make coaches vicariously liable 
for the tortious acts of their players.  In this Section, I show that coaches stand 
on the same footing as those persons enumerated under Article 2180 and thus 
should be held liable for the acts of their players.  An overview of vicarious 
liability is first discussed—its concept, the rationale behind it, and the defenses 
available to the vicarious obligor.  A discussion on the relationship between 
coaches and players follows.  Finally, I conclude with arguments on why 
coaches should be held vicariously liable. 
 
A. Vicarious Liability, Concept 
 
The principle of vicarious liability states, “one is not only liable for his own 
quasi-delictual acts but also for those persons for whom he is responsible under 
the law.”204  It is also called “imputed liability.”205  Article 2180 of the Civil 
Code enumerates those who may be held vicariously liable: 
 
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the 
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor 
children who live in their company. 
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or 
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in 
their company. 
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise 
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their  
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are 
employed or on the occasion of their functions. 
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their 
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of 
                                                 
204. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 81. 
205. Id. 
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their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in 
any business or industry. 
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through 
a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by 
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which 
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. 
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and 
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and 
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their  
custody.206 
 
The enumeration is exclusive.207  According to Philippine Civil Law expert 
Arturo Tolentino, the article must be “construed restrictively”208 because it is an 
“extraordinary responsibility created by way of exception to the rule that no 
person can be liable for the acts or omissions of another.”209  Thus, the  
enumeration cannot be extended to persons not covered by the article.210  For 
example, in Philippine Rabbit Lines, Inc. v. Philippine American Forwarders,211 
the Court construed the article restrictively and held that “owners and managers 
of an establishment or enterprise . . . do not include the manager of a corporation 
[because it] may be gathered from the context of Article 2180 that the term 
‘manager’ (‘director’ in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of  
‘employer.’”212 
The liability of the vicarious obligor is primary and direct, not subsidiary.213  
The vicarious obligor is “solidarily [sic] liable with the tortfeasor.”214  The  
liability is “not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the 
negligent tortfeasor.”215  Hence, the plaintiff can immediately sue the vicarious 
obligor if he so chooses. 
While those responsible for them may be held liable, the actual tortfeasors 
are “not exempted by the law from personal responsibility.”216  Pineda states 
                                                 
206. CIVIL CODE, § 2180, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
207. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE 
PHILIPPINES 612 (reprt. 2002). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. G.R. No. L-25142 (S.C., Mar. 25, 1975) (Phil.). 
212. Id. 
213. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 84. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. (citing de Leon Brokerage v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-15247, 4 S.C.R.A. 517 (S.C., 
Feb. 28, 1962) (Phil.)). 
216. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 83. 
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that “[t]hey may be sued and made liable alone”217 when the vicarious obligor 
proves due diligence on his part.218 
 
B. Groundwork of Vicarious Liability  
 
Tolentino explains that the basis of liability “arises by virtue of a  
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made  
responsible under the [A]rticle.”219  It is “derived from their failure to exercise 
due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from  
causing damage.”220  Tolentino, quoting Giampietro Chironi, gives two  
requisites for vicarious liability to apply: first, there must be the duty of  
supervision present;221 and second, there must be the “possibility of making 
such supervision effective.”222 
Pineda adds that the basis of such liability is “not respondeat superior, 
which under American jurisprudence means that the negligence of the servant 
is conclusively the negligence of the master.  Rather, the basis of Article 2180 
is the principle of pater familias.  The reason for the master’s liability is  
negligence in the supervision of his own subordinates.”223 
Parents are held liable based on the “presumption of failure on their part to 
properly exercise their parental authority for the good education of their children 
and exert adequate vigilance over them.”224  The same principle makes  
guardians liable for the acts of their wards.225  Teachers and school heads are 
held liable because “they stand in loco parentis and are called upon to ‘exercise 
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.’”226  Employers are liable 
for the acts of their employees because they have both the duty to supervise 
them and the power to make the supervision effective.  
 
C. Defenses of the Vicarious Obligor 
 
The vicarious obligor is not without any defenses.  The last paragraph of 
                                                 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. TOLENTINO, supra note 207, at 611. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 612. 
222. Id. 
223. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 82–83 (citing Bahia v. Litonjua, G.R. No. 9743 (S.C., Mar. 3, 2015) 
(Phil.). 
224. TOLENTINO, supra note 207, at 612. 
225. Id. at 614. 
226. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 114 (quoting Palisoc v. Brillantes, G.R. No. L-29025 (S.C., Oct. 4, 
1971) (Phil.)). 
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Article 2180 provides, “[t]he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease 
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of 
a good father of a family to prevent damage.”227  In Bahia v. Litonjua, the Court 
emphasized this: “the presumption [of negligence] is juris tantum and not juris 
et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted.”228  Hence, the vicarious obligor 
is relieved from liability if he proves that he was not negligent in the supervision 
of those under his responsibility.229 
Take for example Cuadra v. Monfort wherein minor Monfort accidentally 
hit Cuadra in the eye with a headband while they were playing in school.230  In 
ruling against the vicarious liability of Monfort’s parents, the Court said: 
 
there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the  
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance 
of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of 
his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the 
act which caused it.231 
 
In the case of employees, the employer must show that he observed “due 
diligence in the selection and supervision of [his] employees.”232 
 
D. Imposing Vicarious Liability on the Coach 
 
i. Void in the Current State of Philippine Law  
 
The current state of Philippine law does not make coaches liable for the acts 
of their players.  While arguments may be raised that coaches are already  
covered under the enumeration in Article 2180 (namely, as employers/managers 
or as teachers), analysis reveals that the present law does not cover the whole 
gamut of situations of coaches and players. 
First, coaches cannot be considered as “owners and managers of an  
establishment or enterprise”233 or “[e]mployers … not engaged in any business 
or industry.”234  A coach cannot be considered an employer of his players.  No 
                                                 
227. CIVIL CODE, § 2180, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
228. G.R. No. L-9734 (S.C., Mar. 31, 1915) (Phil.). 
229. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 117 (citing Radio Commc’ns of the Philippines, Inc. v. Verchez, 
G.R. No. 164349, 520 S.C.R.A. 384 (S.C., Jan. 31, 2006) (Phil.); Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Andres 
Malecdam, G.R. No. 154278, 394 S.C.R.A. 520 (S.C., Dec. 27, 2002) (Phil.)).  
230. Cuadra v. Monfort, G.R. No. L-24101 (S.C., Sept. 30, 1970) (Phil.). 
231. Id.  
232. Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408 (S.C., June 21, 1993) (Phil.). 
233. CIVIL CODE, § 2180, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
234. Id. 
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employer-employee relationship exists between them.  For an  
employer-employee relationship to be present, the following must exist: “(1) the 
manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence 
or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the 
power of control.”235  While the first and third requisites are present in a  
coach-player relationship, the second and fourth requisites are lacking.  The 
coach does not pay the wages of the player.  Moreover, it is debatable whether 
the coach controls the “manner and means [employed by the player] to be used 
in reaching that end.”236  
Barring any situation wherein the coach himself is the owner of the team, 
the coach is but an employee of the team (if professional) or the school (if  
amateur).  Even if the term “manager” is used to describe the position of a coach 
(as is the case in England), coaches are still not covered under Article 2180 
because of Philippine Rabbit Lines Inc., which stated that the “term ‘manager’ 
. . . is used in the sense of ‘employer.’”237  Hence, a coach cannot be held  
vicariously liable as an owner, a manager, or an employer. 
In the amateur sports scene like the UAAP or the NCAA, it is tempting to 
argue that coaches can be held liable as “teacher or heads of establishments of 
arts and trades”238 because of their connection to the school.  However, this is 
not the case.  The Supreme Court interpreted the provision to restrict “teacher” 
to mean “teachers-in-charge.”239  Coaches in academic schools are not  
teachers.  And even if they were considered teachers, they are still not liable 
because coaches are rarely “teachers-in-charge”240 or those “designated by the 
dean, principal, and other administrative superior to exercise supervision over 
the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.”241 
Coaches cannot be designated as “heads of establishments of arts and 
trades”242 for the simple reason that sports teams are not “establishments of arts 
and trades.”243  Even assuming that the a coach was a head of an establishment 
engaged in teaching the finer aspects of a sport (like the Ateneo Football  
Center), he is still not covered by the provision because a school engaged in 
                                                 
235. Almirez v. Infinite Loop Tech. Corp., G.R. No. 162401 (S.C., Jan. 31, 2006) (Phil.), 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/jan2006/G.R.%20No.%20%20162401.htm. 
236. Id. 
237. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Am. Forwarders, Inc., G.R. No. L-25142 (S.C., Mar. 25, 
1975) (Phil.). 
238. CIVIL CODE, § 2180. 
239. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 111.  
240. Id. at 113 (citing Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44745 (S.C., Apr. 15, 1988) (Phil.). 
241. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 113 (citing Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44745 (S.C., 
Apr. 15, 1988) (Phil.). 
242. CIVIL CODE, § 2180. 
243. Id. 
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teaching sports is not an “establishment[] of arts and trades.”244  It is not  
“technical or vocational in nature.”245  Moreover, this paragraph does not cover 
coaches of professional sports teams, like the PBA, because these teams are 
neither “schools” nor “establishments of arts and trades.”246  It also does not 
cover amateur sports teams which are not school-based (like barangay  
basketball leagues) because the players are not “pupils and students or  
apprentices.”247 
Arguments classifying coaches under other persons in Article 2180 are  
easily dispensed with.  Coaches are neither the parents nor the guardians of their 
players.248  They are obviously not the State nor are the players considered  
“special agents.”249  Hence, it is evident that the current state of the law on  
vicarious liability does not cover the liability of coaches over the acts of their 
players.  This is an unfortunate oversight because the rationale behind imposing 
vicarious liability on those enumerated in Article 2180 equally applies to 
coaches as well.  
 
ii. Same Responsibility, Same Duty of Supervision, Different Treatment 
 
Vicarious liability is imposed because of responsibility.  The law imposes 
liability on the one responsible for the presumptive neglect in his supervision 
over his child, ward, employee, student, or secret agent.250  For those who have 
not experienced first-hand the relationship between a coach and a player, this 
responsibility is easily discounted.  The responsibility of a coach is not simply 
limited to “one who instructs players in the fundamentals of a [competitive] 
sport and directs team strategy.”251   
The relationship between coaches and players are likewise founded on  
responsibility and supervision.  Contrary to the dictionary definition, a coach 
does more than just instruct and “direct team strategy.”  Like those enumerated 
in Article 2180, they also “exercise reasonable supervision”252 over their  
                                                 
244. Id. 
245. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 111 (citing Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745 (S.C., 
Apr. 15, 1988) (Phil.). 
246. CIVIL CODE, § 2180. 
247. Id. 
248. See id.  (Save for the situations wherein the coach is the parent of one of his players, but in 
these cases, he will only be liable for the acts of his child, and not of his other players.). 
249. Id. 
250. TOLENTINO, supra note 207, at 611. 
251. Coach, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/coach (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) 
252. PINEDA, supra note 154, at 114 (citing Palisoc v. Brillantes, G.R. No. L-29025 (S.C., Oct. 4, 
1971) (Phil.)). 
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players.  
A coach therefore should be held vicariously liable for three reasons.  First, 
they exercise a duty of supervision and have the power to make this supervision 
effective over their players.  Second, they are familiar with the personalities and 
traits of their players.  Third, the nature of a coach itself makes the coach  
responsible. 
Applying Chironi’s two requisites, a coach should be held vicariously liable 
because a coach has the duty to supervise and the power to make this  
supervision effective over his players. 
 
Duty to Supervise 
 
The main role of the coach is to bring the best out of his player.  He does 
this by supervising his players.  In an article on improving the quality of  
coaching, Mike Voight points out the four responsibilities of a coach.253 
The first is creating an atmosphere that fosters “quality attitude.”254  
Coaches are given the responsibility of shaping the mental attitude and focus of 
their players.255  They are “aware of their specific coaching philosophy and  
behaviors, as well as the effects these attitudes and behaviors have on their  
athletes.”256  To achieve this, coaches must supervise and improve training  
sessions by incorporating lessons on mental toughness to different drills.257  The 
duty also includes creating barriers between a player’s sports life and his  
non-sports life to further enhance a player’s focus.258  
The second responsibility is creating an atmosphere that fosters “quality 
preparation.”259  This involves improving the performance of players during 
training and practice sessions.260  Coaches must supervise training sessions more 
closely by stating the objectives and directions of each exercise in a clear and 
explicit manner.261  It also involves a sense of introspectiveness for the coaches 
who must “[critique] one’s structuring of practice sessions.”262  
The third responsibility is creating an atmosphere that fosters “quality  
                                                 
253. Mike Voight, Improving the Quality of Training Coach and Player Responsibilities, 73 J. 
PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE 43, 43–44 (2002). 
254. Id. at 44. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. See id. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. See id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
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execution.”263  This responsibility revolves around creating match-like  
situations for the players to go through, react, and learn from.264  It also involves 
a coach’s keen eye for players’ mistakes and use of “teachable moments.”265  
Creating match-like situations and improving how a player reacts to these  
situations requires close supervision and adequate feedback to the players.266  A 
coach must do all this while appealing “to each athlete's most salient learning 
style by using different teaching modalities.”267  This entails a working 
knowledge of each player’s character, disposition, and potential. 
The fourth responsibility is creating an atmosphere that fosters “quality  
control.”268  This involves constant improvement of one’s coaching approach 
and techniques.269  This can only be achieved by having a hands-on approach 
during training and games.270  Every practice must be studied closely to  
determine how it benefited the players, and if detrimental, how these can be 
improved.271  Coaches must be in tune with their players and not be  
apprehensive in receiving feedback from their players.272  This requires open 
communication between the coach and the player and a certain sense of  
“emotional commitment” on the side of the coach.273  
These four responsibilities of a coach pertain to the improvement of the 
players in the skills, fitness, and IQ that come with the sports.  Undoubtedly, all 
these entail the duty of a coach to supervise his players.  
 
Possibility of Making the Supervision Effective 
 
A coach also has the power of “making [the] supervision effective.”274  The 
coach is given wide discretion in making [the] supervision effective.275  The 
coach does this in a number of ways. 
First, a coach makes his supervision effective by having the power to choose 
and drop players.  In the world of sports, it is common knowledge that coaches 
                                                 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. (Note: “Teachable moments are those prime opportunities coaches use to teach, instruct, 
direct, encourage, praise, and punish.” - Voight). 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. TOLENTINO, supra note 207, at 612. 
275. Id. 
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have the final word on whom to include in a team’s line-up for the season.  In 
European football leagues, coaches have a huge influence on who the next 
player to be recruited will be.  The coach is free to decide which player fits into 
his coaching philosophy and which player does not.  For example, former  
Barcelona FC coach Pep Guardiola re-instilled a more fluid and  
passing-oriented mentality to his players when he took over the club in 2008, 
and chose players who fit this playing style.276  
Second, a coach makes his supervision effective by determining which 
players play and which players get benched.  At the end of the day, players who 
have impressed the coach by their skills or discipline get the nod to play.  Players 
who also fit into particular situations presented by the flow of the game also get 
the nod.  Benching a player can mean numerous things—a sign of a lack of trust, 
a reprimand to the player, or simply the lack of need for the player’s skill set.277   
But whatever reason there is, one thing remains constant—the decision is left to 
the discretion of coach.  
Third, a coach makes his supervision effective by imposing his own  
mentality and strategy on the game.  As Voight pointed out, the supervision of 
a coach extends to the mental focus and attitude of the player.278  The  
supervision can sometimes be seen as a form of control. A coach can instill a 
certain mentality for his players to adopt, whether this mentality is an aggressive 
one or a passive one all depends on him.  Players who do not fit the mold of a 
coach’s mentality are either forced to change their style or leave the team.  For 
example, NBA coach Chuck Daly brought a hard-nosed defensive mentality 
when he became head coach of the Detroit Pistons in the late-1980s.279  The 
Pistons became known as the “Bad Boys” and anyone watching them at that 
time would attest that each player (led by Dennis Rodman and Bill Laimbeer) 
embraced the mentality with their tough play.280  
Given that the two requisites of Chironi for vicarious liability are present, it 
should follow that coaches should be vicariously liable for the acts of their  
players. 
                                                 
276. Michael Walker, Pep Guardiola Was the Boy Born to Lead Barcelona; an In-depth Look at 
the Nou Camp Sensation, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/foot-
ball/article-1267325/Pep-Guardiola-boy-born-lead-Barcelona-depth-look-Nou-Camp-sensation.html. 
277. Author was a soccer coach from 2004–2006, and these were the main considerations in fielding 
his players. 
278. Voight, supra note 253, at 44. 
279. Tony Meyer, Chuck Daly: The Ultimate Bad Boy, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 7, 2009), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/135447-chuck-daly-the-ultimate-bad-boy.  
280. Benjamin Morris, Just How Bad Were the ‘Bad Boys’?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/just-how-bad-were-the-bad-boys/.  
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Coach’s Familiarity with the Players 
Coaches should also be liable for the acts of their players because they are 
familiar, or at least in a position to be familiar, with the traits, personalities, and 
character of their players.  
The coach is present in every training session and game.  He knows how 
each player will react to certain situations, especially those that test his  
character.  With the physical, emotional, and mental hardships that his players 
endure from each training session and game, the coach is in the position to see 
how each player copes with the hardships, losses, or disappointments.  Does the 
player fight through the hardship and improve?  Does the player give up?  Does 
he take it in stride?  Or worse, does the player take out his frustrations on others?  
Knowing these traits are part of the duty of a coach in order to improve both the 
player’s and his own performance. 
In fact, coach Karen Cacho, a former coach of the Ateneo women’s soccer 
team, states the importance of knowing her players on an individual basis:  
 
I would describe my relationship with my players in a case to 
case basis.  Although [sic] i [sic] am dealing with a team or unit, 
i [sic] have to respect the fact that they are individuals and each 
has its own unique mood, understanding, character etc.  As a 
coach you have to consider this and be cautious as to how you 
communicate and treat each one separately.281 
 
The coach also chooses his players.  After consulting with his staff, the 
coach has the final say on who makes the team.  This decision process entails 
that the coach study a potential player as a whole—from the skill set of the 
player, to his physical fitness, to his capability in fulfilling a need for the team, 
to his temperament, and even up to the player’s relation with his other  
teammates.  All these aspects are taken into consideration.282  
This familiarity with his players, borne from his constant interaction with 
them and the fact that he chose them to play for his team, validly raises the 
argument that he knows of any violent or reckless demeanor that the player may 
possess.  Thus, when a player recklessly injures an opponent, the coach must be 
held liable for allowing such a player to endanger the safety of other players. 
The Nature of the Coach As Having Responsibility over Players 
By the very nature of the job, the coach is responsible over his players.  The 
                                                 
281. E-mail from Karen Cacho, Former Coach of the Ateneo Women’s Football Team to Ignatius 
Michael D. Ingles (May 18, 2011) (on file with author). 
282. Author was a football coach from 2004–2006 and experienced this firsthand. 
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responsibility is something innate in the role of a coach, akin to how a parent 
feels naturally responsible for his or her child, or how a teacher feels naturally 
responsible for his or her student.  As can be seen from the interviews below, 
coaches feel this responsibility is intrinsically linked with the job.  
Coach Hans Peter Smit, long-time coach of the De La Salle University and 
De La Salle Zobel football teams, states that he “always [feels] responsible for 
all [his] players.”283  The successful coach also “personally goes beyond [the 
professional coach-player relationship]” because of his nature to “nurture [his] 
players.”284  Because of this, he describes his relationship with his players as a 
“a mentor; father-son; father-daughter; manager; guidance counselor.”285  This 
responsibility, he claims, “has nothing to do with the school or the club that I 
work for.”286  Instead, it just comes out naturally for him.287  In fact, his  
responsibility over his players extends after training or games, and sometimes 
even extends to other teams:  
 
It go's [sic] way beyond training/games.  Even if they are away 
from me I take it as my responsibility that they are always on 
their best behavior.  I believe in Fair Play!  I will berate my 
players if I see them not playing for the merits of the game.  I 
would even berate players from the other team if I see the 
same.288  
 
This sentiment is shared by coach Sandy Arespacochaga, former coach of 
the Ateneo men’s basketball team.  The former UAAP standout states that his 
responsibility over his Blue Eagles stem from “the nature of being a coach and 
more so from being a coach of the school.”289  For coach Sandy, the  
responsibility is not limited to teaching the X’s and O’s of a basketball game: “I 
think coaches from Ateneo have to act like teachers to the players also, and that 
would mean teaching proper values in and out of the court as well (not to  
mention helping players focus on academics).”290  Like coach Hans, coach 
Sandy believes that “coaches have to teach players to be responsible outside of 
                                                 
283. E-mail from Hans Smit, De La Salle Univ. to Ignatius Michael D. Ingles (May 15, 2011) (on 
file with author). 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
289. E-mail from Sandy Arespacochaga, Ateneo de Manila Univ. to Ignatius Michael D. Ingles 
(May 16, 2011) (on file with author). 
290. Id. 
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the court also.”291  
Coach Cristina Garcia, although just a few years older than her players in 
the Ateneo Women’s Football team who she coached in 2010, felt the same way 
as her more experienced counterparts.  She felt that she was “entrusted by [her 
players’] parents to make sure they [we]re ok.”292  This reposed trust made her 
feel “very responsible”293 for her players.  However, her responsibility over 
them extended only to matters related to her duties as a coach—like games, 
trainings and out-of-town trips.294 
This sense of responsibility over players is not limited to those who coach 
professionally.  Even volunteer coaches feel the same way.  Matthew Jaucian 
coached Gawad Kalinga kids the basic skills of football.  As a volunteer coach, 
he still felt responsible “for both their well-being and how they carry  
themselves.”295  Considering the plight and poor background of his players, 
coach Matthew felt that he “took over the responsibility of [his players’] parents 
in providing a model of what a good responsible adult should be.”296  While his 
sense of responsibility stemmed from carrying the name of Gawad Kalinga,297 
Coach Matthew felt responsible “simply because whoever they become will  
ultimately reflect on me.”298  Coach Matthew not only took on the role of a 
coach, but a role model as well. 
The responsibility of the coach stems from the very nature of the role of a 
coach.  While there are some cases where the responsibility stems from a  
contractual obligation, in almost all cases, the source of this responsibility goes 
beyond contracts.  As attested to by the coaches themselves, this responsibility 
is innate.  The responsibility exists simply because they are coaches. 
If the tie that binds an employer to the acts of his employee or the state to a 
special agent is a contract, what more when the source of the responsibility is 
the very nature of the relationship itself?  This is the case with parents and their 
children, guardians with their wards, teachers and their students.  So it is with 
coaches and players.  This reason alone should make coaches liable for the  
tortious acts of their players. 
 
                                                 
291. Id. 
292. E-mail from Cristina Garcia, Ateneo de Manila Univ. to Ignatius Michael D. Ingles (May 18, 
2011) (on file with author). 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. E-mail from Matthew Jaucian, Gawad Kalinga to Ignatius Michael D. Ingles (May 20, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
296. Id. 
297. Gawad Kalinga is a Philippine-based movement aimed at alleviating poverty in the Philippines. 
298. E-mail from Matthew Jaucian, Gawad Kalinga to Ignatius Michael D. Ingles (May 20, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
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iii. Defenses Applicable to the Coach 
 
While I seek to impose liability on the coach, the coach is not without any 
defenses.  He can avail himself of the defense found in the final paragraph of 
Article 2180, which states that “[t]he responsibility treated of in this article shall 
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the  
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”299  This combats any 
injustice that may arise from imposing liability on the coach who exercised “all 
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage”300 to other players. 
Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston University301 is instructive when it comes 
to a defense that a coach may have against vicarious liability.  Kavanagh was a 
Manhattan College basketball player and played opposite Boston University 
player Folk.302  A scuffle ensued between the opposing teams and Kavanagh 
came in to intervene.303  As Kavanagh was breaking up the scuffle, Folk 
punched him square in the face.304  Folk was ejected, while Kavanagh left with 
a broken nose.305  Kavanagh filed a case against coach Wolff of Boston  
University, claiming that Wolff was negligent in not taking the appropriate steps 
to prevent the fight.306  
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts disagreed with Kavanagh and denied 
recovery.307  One of the reasons posed by the Court focused on the vicarious 
liability of the university and the coach: 
 
[N]either the university nor its coach had any reason to foresee 
that Folk would engage in violent behavior.  He had never done 
so before, he had no history suggestive of potential violence on 
or off that basketball court, and nothing in his conduct during 
the earlier part of the game provided any warning signal that 
                                                 
299. CIVIL CODE, § 2180, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
300. Id.  
301. 795 N.E.2d 1170 (Mass. 2003). 
302. Id. at 1173. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. at 117273 (One of Kavanagh’s other theories dealt with the aggressive demeanor of Coach 
Wolff. He claimed that Wolff’s demeanor made him liable for the attack.  Analysis of the case reveals 
that this theory, if applied to our jurisdiction, attacked Coach Wolff as a principal tortfeasor, and was 
not under a theory of vicarious liability.  On that point, the Court held that the coach still was not liable, 
and would only be liable if his own acts were reckless in their own right, or that he deliberately  
instructed the player to commit the attack.  On the latter point, the coach would be liable as a joint 
tortfeasor in our jurisdiction under Article 2194. This is not part of the scope of this study.). 
307. Id. at 117980. 
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Folk was on the verge of a violent outburst.308 
 
Hence, a coach faced with such vicarious liability can argue that he had no 
knowledge of prior violence on the part of his player and therefore, could not 
foresee, much less prevent, an attack from occurring. 
Another defense can be inferred in the case of Tomjanovich v. California 
Sports.309  In this case, NBA player Rudy Tomjanovich was punched in the face 
by an L.A. Lakers player, Kermit Washington.310  Tomjanovich suffered serious 
injuries, including “skull fractures, facial lacerations, loss of blood, and leakage 
of brain cavity spinal fluid.”311  Tomjanovich sued Washington and the L.A. 
Lakers.  In suing the Lakers on vicarious liability, Tomjanovich claimed that 
the team not only knew of the violent disposition of Washington, but also even 
encouraged it by having Washington featured in a magazine as a league  
enforcer.312  The jury ruled in favor of Tomjanovich, and on appeal, a settlement 
was reached.313  While the Tomjanovich case sought vicarious liability against 
a team, the same principles can be applied to a coach.  A coach can use the 
defense that he did not encourage the violent conduct.  
A coach can also proffer the defense used by employers when faced with 
vicarious liability suits by proving due diligence in the selection and supervision 
of their employees.314  Coaches can show that they have previously reprimanded 
their players for unsportsmanlike conduct or reckless fouls, and also prove that 
during the process of selection, the player involved had no prior record of  
violent or reckless play. 
 
IV. END GAME 
 
Sports injuries happen.  Basketball players land awkwardly going for a  
rebound and twist their ankles.  The legs of a soccer player turn black and blue 
from all the tackles they have to endure on the field.  Boxers and mixed martial 
artists look like bloody caricatures after heated fights.  And occasionally, a 
rugby player loses a chunk of his ear in a scrum.  These are all part of the game, 
risks that the players can reasonably foresee and are often not complained about.  
The law has no business in these injuries, lest the competitive spirit and vigor 
                                                 
308. Id. at 1178. 
309. No. H-78-243, 1979 WL 210977 (S.D. Tex. 1979).  
310. CHAMPION, supra note 9, at 150 (citing Tomjanovich v. Cal. Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243, 1979 
WL 210977 (S.D. Tex. 1979)). 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. Pro Basketball History Revisited: Pro Basketball Legal Cases 1974-84, APBR (Apr. 24, 2011), 
http://apbrbasketball.blogspot.com/2011/04/pro-basketball-legal-cases-1974-84.html. 
314. Lilius v. Manila R.R. Co., G.R. No. L-39587 (S.C., Mar. 24, 1934) (Phil.). 
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involved in sports competitions be doused with the fear of possible litigation.315 
Some injuries, however, are not foreseeable.  And this is where the law 
should step in.  These injuries are sustained because of the intentional or  
reckless acts of players who have no regard for the rules established to protect 
the safety of the players.  A point guard does not reasonably foresee a frustrated 
center elbowing him mid-flight as he soars for a lay-up.  A soccer goalie does 
not foresee that an opposing forward will kick him in the head after the play is 
over.  Even with emotions running high, a football player does not foresee an 
unprovoked blow to his head.  These sorts of acts have no place in sports.  They 
overstep the boundaries of sportsmanlike competition and turn tests of skill into 
cringe-inducing acts of violence.  
In these situations, the law should allow recovery to the injured player.  
However, because of the risks assumed whenever one joins a sports  
competition, the standard needed for recovery should not be so low as to induce 
fear of litigation for every tackle or foul.  Neither should it be too high as well 
and forget that some fouls and tackles are not foreseeable.316 
The U.S. cases discussed in Section I have already provided this standard—
the duty to refrain from the reckless disregard of safety rules.  While this  
standard has yet to be adopted in the Philippines, the foundations of the standard 
can already be found in existing laws and jurisprudence.  Adopting it poses no  
problem.  Moreover, it protects the athlete.  It does not coddle him; he will still 
not recover from foreseeable injuries.  But it does not protect the reckless player 
either; his acts that disregard safety rules will not go unpunished. 
While the player is the one toiling and working hard in the field, rink, or 
court, placing the blame solely on him is unjust.  Coaches play an immense role 
in shaping how their players approach a game.  In the end, they should also be 
responsible for the acts of their players.  Coaches have the duty to supervise and 
the power to make their supervision effective, similar to those relationships in 
Article 2180.  Their constant interaction with their players also makes them  
familiar with their players’ tendencies, giving them valuable insight to the  
different traits, characteristics, and personalities of their players.  More  
importantly, the very nature of the role of a coach makes him or her responsible 
for his or her players.  This responsibility is innate in a coach.  It exists with or 
without the presence of contracts.  
The coach shares the same responsibility that a parent has over his child, a 
guardian has over his ward, an employer has over his employees, a teacher or 
head of establishment of arts and trades has over his student or apprentice, and 
the State has over its special agents.  Thus, the coach should be held vicariously 
liable for the acts of his players. 
                                                 
315. Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 338 (Conn. 1997). 
316. See id. 
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V. A CALL TO THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS AND COURTS 
 
A. Amending Article 2180 and Guidelines for Interpretation 
 
In line with my arguments, I recommend that Article 2180 of the Civil Code 
be amended to include the following paragraph: 
 
Professional coaches shall be liable for the damages caused by 
their players during the course of competitions involving  
contact sports, so long as the players are in the team roster or, 
for individual contact sports, under the supervision of the 
coach, at the time of the incident. 
 
Likewise, to hold the coach vicariously liable, the following requisites must 
occur. 
First, the player must be liable for a tortious act.  To fulfill this requisite, the 
plaintiff must prove that the act of the defendant player was either intentional or 
a breach of the duty to refrain from the reckless disregard of safety rules.  In the 
case of the latter, a safety rule must have been violated, and the act that violates 
the rule must have been reckless and not merely negligent. 
Second, the coach must be a professional.  At the outset, the meaning of 
“professional” in this provision must not be restricted to the common notion of 
a coach under contract by a team or school (like Norman Black or Phil Jackson).  
It applies equally to coaches who, while not under contract or receive  
remuneration, have a considerable amount of experience coaching a particular 
sport.  This is to emphasize that the responsibility of a coach goes beyond a 
contractual tie.  Hence, a coach who has been coaching a school team for a 
considerable amount of time can be held vicariously liable, even if he does it for 
free. 
The qualification that one must be “professional” is needed to prevent the 
unjust situation wherein “weekend” coaches or mere stand-ins in barangay or 
office leagues are dragged into court because of vicarious liability.  One must 
remember that vicarious liability is “created by way of exception to the rule that 
no person can be liable for the acts or omissions of another[,]”317 hence its  
application should be limited.  
While there is no strict definition as to what a professional coach is, the 
presence of a coaching contract is a patent factor to consider one as a  
professional coach.  If the coach is under a coaching contract, then he must  
automatically be considered a professional coach.  However, it must again be 
                                                 
317. TOLENTINO, supra note 207, at 612. 
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emphasized that the absence of a coaching contract is not determinative that one 
should not be considered a professional coach.  As such, courts can also consider 
the length of time one has been coaching a particular sport.  The longer one has 
been coaching, the more he can be considered as a professional.   
The distinction between a professional coach and a non-professional coach 
is a reasonable one.  A professional coach, as gleaned from the factors above, is 
one whose experience and exposure to the sport make him more aware of its 
hazards and should thus make him more responsible for the tortious acts of his 
or her players.  Hence, this provision will fortunately not apply to a man asked 
by his friends to stand-in as “coach” during a barangay basketball league.   
However, if the man continues as coach for a considerable amount of time and 
takes on the duties of a coach, then this provision possibly applies to him. 
Third, the tortious act must have happened in a contact sport. A contact 
sport is one “that necessarily involves body contact between opposing  
players.”318  Examples of contact sports are soccer, basketball, rugby, hockey, 
baseball, and boxing.  Hence, the provision will not apply to sports such as  
badminton, tennis, synchronized swimming, or billiards.  Injuries are more  
foreseeable in contact sports, hence the distinction.  Thus, coaches are  
duty-bound to guide their players to refrain from such behavior accordingly.  It 
is unfair to impose vicarious liability on a coach for an injury that was  
unforeseeable because of the very nature of the sport.  A limited application of 
this provision prevents any absurd situation wherein a tennis coach will be 
forced to defend himself against vicarious liability because his player  
intentionally throws his racket at his opponent.319     
Fourth, the tortious act must have occurred during a sports competition.  
Sports competition should be interpreted to mean the actual game or match  
itself.  This includes practice games and training sessions.  It includes the period 
of warm-up until the players have cooled down after the game or training  
session.  For example, if a scuffle ensues while players are warming up, the 
coach may be held vicariously liable.  It should not be interpreted to extend 
beyond the game.  For example, in a two-week event like the Palarong  
Pambansa, where the games are scheduled throughout, the coach should only 
be liable for the tortious acts of the players during the actual games.  Moreover, 
if the tortious acts of the players occur a considerable time after the game, the 
coach should not be liable.  Hence, if a basketball player gets into a fight in the 
parking lot after a game, the coach is not liable.  
                                                 
318. Contact Sport, VOCABULARY, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/contact%20sport (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
319. Note, however, that there is no distinction between contact sports and non-contact sports when 
it comes to the liability of the player.  As long as the player breaches his duty to refrain from reckless 
acts done in disregard of safety rules, the player will be held responsible, regardless of what sport is 
involved. 
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Fifth, the player was on the team roster, or under the supervision of the 
coach (for non-team sports) at the time of the incident.  This includes players 
who are on the bench.  For example, in case a bench-clearing brawl occurs  
during a basketball game, the coach should still be held vicariously liable.  
Moreover, it should be interpreted to include players who are not formally listed 
on the team roster, but who play under the coach or are on the team at that time.  
For example, players fielded by the coach during try-outs come within this  
interpretation.320  
Lastly, the coach must be the head coach of the team or the player at the 
time of the incident.  Thus, while the assistant coach, physical trainers, weight 
trainers, and team managers are often referred to as “coach” by the players, they 
are not held liable under this article.  The limitation to the head coach stems 
from the nature of his position as the one who has the final word and discretion 
in team matters.  While the assistant coaches and managers have their own say 
on team and player matters, this power is limited to advising the head coach, 
advice which the head coach has the discretion to heed or not.  This also includes 
instances wherein the coach is not actually on the sidelines at the time of the 
incident (e.g., he was suspended or absent) because his absence still does not 
discount the fact that he chooses which players make the team and that he knows 
the traits and personalities of his players.  This is not unjust because the coach 
can still avail of the defense by showing, according to the circumstances, that 
he was still diligent in “prevent[ing the] damage.”321  A lack of any one of these 
requisites will not make a coach vicariously liable. 
To protect himself from liability, the coach may use a number of defenses.  
He can argue he was not aware of the violent or reckless nature of his player.  
He can also prove that the player had never engaged in violent or reckless acts 
in the past, and thus the player’s action was unforeseeable from his point of 
view.  Further, he can argue that he previously reprimanded the player for  
previous violent or reckless acts.  Furthermore, he can show that he never  
encouraged such violent or reckless acts in the past, and that he always  
encouraged the values of fair play and sportsmanlike conduct.  Lastly, he can 
demonstrate that he was diligent in both the selection and supervision of his 
players.  
This list of defenses is not exclusive.  As long as the coach shows that he 
exercised “all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage,”322 
he should be relieved of liability.  The courts should look at the factual  
circumstances, keeping in mind the standards proposed by this article. 
                                                 
320. While it may be argued that imposing liability on the coach for try-out players is unjust since 
he is not familiar with them, I believe that it is not unjust.  The coach can still avail of the defense that 
he was not aware of the violent or reckless nature of the player trying-out. 
321. CIVIL CODE, § 2180, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.). 
322. Id. 
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B. Answering the Case Study 
 
Applying the recommendations to the Case Study, it seems Padernal is  
liable for his rash tackle on Tobias.  His slide tackle was a reckless disregard of 
a safety rule.  It was reckless because the slide tackle was clearly intended, even 
if the injury was not.  The act of tackling was voluntary.  He did not slip on the 
muddy field.  He was trying to win possession of the ball, even if Tobias had 
already secured it.  It likewise disregarded a safety rule.  FIFA Rules state, 
“When a goalkeeper has gained possession of the ball with his hands, he cannot 
be challenged by an opponent.”323  It also states, “[A] player must be penalised 
for playing in a dangerous manner if he kicks or attempts to kick the ball when 
the goalkeeper is in the process of releasing it.”324  This is no doubt a safety rule; 
it prevents injury by prohibiting dangerous play.  These two rules protect the 
goalie from dangerous play when he has the ball, or even when he is in the 
process of kicking it back into play.  Hence, Padernal is liable for Tobias’ injury.   
Applying the proposed amendment to Article 2180 and the recommended 
guidelines makes coach Caslib liable.  First, Padernal’s slide tackle committed 
a tortious act.  Second, the act occurred during a sports competition, which in 
this case, was a practice game between Ateneo and San Beda.  Third, Padernal 
was on the San Beda team roster.  Even if he was not, he was still fielded by the 
coach Caslib.  Fourth, coach Caslib was the head coach of San Beda at that time. 
The defense in Article 2180 is not available to Caslib.  He already knew of 
Padernal’s reckless nature.  Padernal was his player both in San Beda and in the 
youth national teams.  He even recruited Padernal to play for San Beda. Hence, 
Caslib cannot claim that he was unaware of Padernal’s traits as a player.  These 
all point to coach Caslib’s responsibility over his players’ acts, a responsibility 
that leads to his vicarious liability under the proposed amended Article 2180. 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
A month after Tobias’ injury, Ateneo faced San Beda again, this time in an 
official pre-season tournament match.  Pursuant to the ban, Padernal sat on the 
bench when the two teams kicked off.  However, in the second half and with 
Ateneo leading 10, coach Caslib, knowing full well of the ban on Padernal and 
the consequences of playing him, brought Padernal into the pitch.  The Ateneo 
team walked out of the game, forfeiting their 10 lead and handing the game to 
the Red Lions. 
                                                 
323. FIFA, LAWS OF THE GAME 2010/2011, 112 (2010), http://www.fifa.com/mm/document 
/affederation/generic/81/42/36/lawsofthegame_2010_11_e.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
324. Id. at 113. 
